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Abstract
In this paper we address the issue of tax burden and its measurement, beginning
with a discussion of use of tax-to-GDP ratio for this purpose. We show that this commonly
used indicator has a number of flaws, related to the methodology of calculation of taxes
and GDP in national accounts. Firstly, tax revenue calculated in accordance with ESA95
methodology is not perfectly in line with the economic concept of taxes, i.e. levies imposed
by the government, which are compulsory and unrequited. Secondly, both tax revenue and
GDP include a government component, which distorts the true picture of tax burden. Taxes
paid on government expenditure have no impact on the deficit, do not affect incentives, do
not constitute a ‘burden‘ on economic activity and may also distort cyclical adjustment of
the budget. We propose a number of adjustments to deal with these problems and apply
them to data for Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The results indicate that in these countries,
the underlying (methodologically and cyclically adjusted) tax burden imposed on economic
activity has followed different trends from those implied by the headline tax-to-GDP ratios.
The results show that it is also important to look at the headline and adjusted measures of
the tax burden in disaggregated terms, namely dividing the tax burden into labour,
corporate and indirect tax components. 
JEL classification: H20
Keywords: tax burden, cyclical adjustment6
1
Introduction
National Bank of Poland
1
Introduction
The size and structure of the tax burden is one of the most important ways in which
government actions affect economic activity. The linkages involved are complex and multi-
faceted, as taxes impact private agents‘ incentives, cyclical developments, long-term
growth and the distribution of income and wealth. Taxes also affect different groups of
agents in different ways and consequently, are perceived by them differently. Companies
are interested in their post tax profits; their effective tax burden has distorting effects on
their economic behaviour, e.g. investment decisions are based on post-tax profit
projections. These distortions cause excess burden over the tax revenue raised. Apart from
those efficiency considerations which are taken into account in labour supply decisions,
households may also be concerned with redistributive properties of taxation (tax
incidence). This is related to the distribution of the tax burden and can be measured by
what is called vertical and horizontal equity. Social preferences seem to be often in favour
of higher (progressive) taxation of higher incomes, because proportional taxation (i.e.
vertical equity) conflicts with fairness. Fairness considerations usually also require that
taxpayers with the same income would bear the same tax burden (i.e. horizontal equity).
Governments aim at finding an optimal design of taxation, which takes into account both
efficiency considerations and social preferences, which are often in conflict. They are
interested not only in the structure of taxation, but also in the significance of the
aggregated tax revenue compared to GDP. In the rest of this chapter we provide an
overview of the problems related to the measurement and interpretation of the aggregated
tax burden indicators. 
The most commonly used and simple aggregated tax burden indicator is the tax-to-
GDP ratio, which is a measure of what percentage of production is transferred to general
government in the form of compulsory, unrequited payments. For those countries which
have deficits, the actual tax-to-GDP ratio is a distorted measure of the size of the
government, although the tax-to-GDP ratio is ultimately determined by the desired level of
spending, this level has to be financed through taxation only in the future. Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971a, 1971b) defined an ”optimal” fiscal burden as the value placed by society
on public goods financed by taxes divided by the loss of efficiency caused by taxation.
Although the expenditure-to-GDP ratio and the tax-to-GDP ratio cannot capture the value
(quality) of the public goods and the excess burden of taxation,1 respectively, these ratios
are often used as reference points in economic and political debates.2
1 Microeconomic analysis of the individual tax burden calls for a very detailed study of the behaviour of
economic agents in an economy. Excess burden is difficult to be estimated, since the distorting effects on
the economic behaviour can be captured only in a complex model-based approach that includes several
assumptions regarding household behaviour etc. In an optimal case the effective tax rates should be inversely
proportional to the elasticity of different tax bases (incomes, commodities) in order to minimise excess
burden (Alm, 1996, Slemrod, 1990). Apart from minimising allocative distortions, different rates can be
justified by the need for the internalisation of external effects (Atkinson and Stern, 1974), or incentives for
innovation (OECD, 2008). These optimal tax rates, however, may conflict with social preferences regarding
horizontal equity and vertical inequity.
2 For example some studies have attempted to measure the effect of taxation on per capita output by
regressing directly the growth rate and the tax-to-GDP ratios, but the results were contradictory. Engen and
Skinner (1992) find that changes in aggregate average tax rate do not have significant effects on growth.
Marsden (1986) finds that the tax-to-GDP ratio has a significant, negative impact on output growth,
especially for lower-income countries.1
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Despite the continuous efforts of several international organizations in determining
tax revenue, the comparability of tax-to-GDP ratio across countries and time has raised
some concerns (Messere and Owens, 1987, OECD, 2000, Burn, 2004, P. Kiss, 2005). These
refer not only to the numerator of the ratio, i.e. the overall amount of taxes collected, but
also to the denominator, where the GDP is not necessarily the most appropriate base for
comparisons (Brown and Jackson, 1978). Furthermore, the cyclical developments affect tax
revenue and GDP differently due to composition effects; therefore cyclical effects should be
filtered out. 
There are several measurement problems of the tax revenue, which will be discussed
in the next chapter in more detail. The OECD identified borderline cases between different
categories such as tax expenditure and expenditure. As a result of the different
methodology, OECD tax data are slightly different from the national accounts classification
of tax data (OECD 2007). This classification, however, is not exhaustive and for example
does not address the problems of tax treatment of corporate losses carried forward (OECD,
2000). Another issue is that the European national accounts (ESA) record part of VAT and
customs duties as indirect taxes paid to the EU removing them from indirect taxes collected
by the member state. For comparability reasons the ESCB decided to impute them (ECB,
2007). Headline tax burden measures also exclude certain types of burden imposed on
employers in the form of social benefits they are required to pay to their employees
(Adema, 1998). These compulsory social benefits can be imputed as transfers and taxes (P.
Kiss, 2005). Additionally, according to some authors, part of the excises on fuel can be
classified as a fee for using the public road network (Newbery-Révész 1996, 2000). 
The comparison and interpretation of the tax burden is further complicated as a
result of the difference between the tax burden faced by the private and government
sectors. For example, different tax treatment of social benefits distorts comparability
(OECD, 2000, 2006, the Danish Ministry of Taxation, 20083). Since tax components of the
government expenditure are included in both the revenue and expenditure side, they may
also distort the assessment of the composition of fiscal measures. For example, an increase
in spending on government wages would, ceteris paribus, increase both expenditure, as
well as revenue (due to higher revenue from personal income taxes).4 As an alternative to
their simple exclusion from the tax burden, the OECD decided to report the identifiable tax
components as memorandum items (OECD interpretative guide). Another option is the
exclusion of all taxes and contributions paid by the government to itself (P. Kiss, 2005). In
addition to taxes paid directly on government expenditure, such as labour taxes on
government salaries and VAT on government investment, social benefits and public wages
affect the disposable income of the households. This leads to an indirect impact of
government expenditure on tax collection through consumption taxes (OECD, 2006,
Mars ˇanová and Ódor, 2008). This means that one can define two alternative measures of
private taxes; the ”broad” measure excludes only the direct tax component of the
government spending, while the ”narrow” measure excludes also the indirect tax
component paid by the recipients of government transfers and wages on their
consumption. The latter measure provides a further delineation between tax and spending
measures, by calculating changes in social benefits and public wages net of direct and
indirect taxes. Since the ”narrow” measure excludes all taxes financed with government
3 ”International comparisons show that traditionally calculated tax burdens and other tax burden
measurements are heavily influenced by the organisation of the individual country’s tax and transfer income
systems.(…) An example of this is that in Denmark the tax burden technically rose between 1993 and 1994
as a consequence of the restructuring of a number of social pensions from fully or partially tax free, to fully
taxable. Contributions before tax rose accordingly.”
4 Therefore, in order to obtain an accurate picture of the impact of fiscal measures, both spending and revenue
measures should be measured in net terms, i.e. in terms of their impact on the deficit. Spending measures
should be measured net of taxes, while tax measures should be measured as changes of private taxes, since
changes in the public taxes have no effect on the deficit.8
1
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spending, it is closer to the concept of measuring the tax burden on actual economic
activity. On the other hand, the calculation of the "narrow" measure is more demanding in
terms of assumptions concerning the propensity to consume out of government wages
and social benefits. 
Both measure of the private tax burden can be interpreted as the percentage of the
private GDP which is transferred to government. The problem here is the measurement of
the private GDP, which has three different approaches, the expenditure5, the production6
and the income7 measures. The aggregated private tax revenue is not consistent with any
single measure of the private GDP. The only solution is disaggregating the tax revenue into
two major groups of taxes, and then aggregating them again (P. Kiss, 2005). Direct taxes
and contributions paid by the private sector are consistent with the income measure of the
private GDP at factor costs; therefore a ”direct” burden ratio can be calculated. The major
part of indirect taxes paid by the private taxes is consistent with the expenditure measure
of the private GDP, a minor part is consistent with the production measure of the private
sector. For the sake of simplicity all private indirect taxes can be compared to the private
demand by calculating an ”indirect” burden ratio.8
Disaggregating the private tax burden has two other advantages. First, the potential
distortions caused by the cyclical developments can be properly removed only by
disaggregating tax bases. While trend GDP can be estimated relatively easily, cyclical effects
are more difficult to be removed from the tax revenue, because the composition of the
aggregate output gap matters if there are ”tax-rich” and ”tax-poor” elements like wages
and profits. Bouthevillan et al (2001) argue that the aggregate output gap hides the
underlying developments. While the same output gap can be made up from various
components, its effect on taxes will vary depending on this composition. In order to
establish reliable links between the major tax bases and the cyclical fluctuations, the so-
called disaggregated measures of the cyclical adjustment calculates several gaps instead of
focusing on the aggregate output gap (Bouthevillain et al., 2001; P. Kiss and Vadas, 2006).
These approaches define cyclical fluctuations by restricting them to the developments in
the private sector, i.e. government wages, consumption and investment are excluded. The
latter variables are determined by the fiscal policy; therefore their changes can be described
rather as ”fiscal shocks”. This approach is consistent with the ”broad” measure of the
private taxes and private GDP.
Another advantage of the disaggregated tax burden is that it can be used to
measure a benchmark case to assess deviations from horizontal or vertical equity (P. Kiss,
2005). The ”direct” and ”indirect” burden ratios can be seen as two benchmark tax rates,
which indicate what the tax rates would be that produce approximately the same tax
revenue under horizontal equity. Comparing effective tax rates to these benchmark tax
rates one can determine the size of redistribution between sectors or different groups of
tax-payers. The estimation of the size of these implicit transfers between tax-payers can
complement similar measures in the expenditure side of the government. It could also
augment the calculation of the gross social spending (OECD 2006) with the difference
5 This is equal to the use of private income, which is the sum of private domestic demand and net exports.
6 This is the total market value of goods and services produced in the private sector by deducting the cost of
goods utilized in the process of production.
7 The income measure of the private GDP at factor costs can be seen as the income of the producers in the
private sector, which is then distributed through payments to workers (wages) and capital (profits). The GDP
at market prices includes also indirect taxes paid to the government, but their inclusion in the denominator
would not be consistent with their exclusion from the numerator. According to some other arguments if the
significance of indirect taxes differs across countries and time, variations in the tax-to-GDP ratio would be
sensitive to variations in the share of indirect taxes (Brown and Jackson, 1978, P. Kiss, 2005).
8 In the case of the „narrow” measure of the private tax burden, indirect taxes paid by the recipients of
government transfers and wages would be excluded from the numerator, and the sum of government
transfers and wages would be excluded from the denominator (i.e. private demand).1
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between the effective tax rates and the benchmark tax rates, which can either reveal
preferential tax treatment of benefit recipients or ”overtaxing”. 
In this paper we calculate an adjusted private tax burden and then a cyclically
adjusted ”underlying” private burden. We measure a ”broad” private burden, which means
that the taxes paid directly by the government are subtracted from the total tax burden.
We also determine the benchmark tax rates for both indirect and direct taxes, which would
produce the same tax revenue under horizontal equity. The comparisons between the
actual effective tax rates and these hypothetical benchmark tax rates as a measure of
redistribution are beyond the scope of our study. The rest of the paper is organised as
follows. First the methodology we used is described. After that our data sources are
presented. Then our results are discussed. Finally we conclude.10
2
Method




In this section we define a comparable measure of the adjusted taxes (AT). Our
calculation is based on the tax data consistent with the European System of National
Accounts (ESA). The total tax revenue is equal to the sum of direct taxes (D.5R), indirect
taxes (D.2R), social contributions (D.61R) and capital taxes (D.91R). 
According to their usual definition taxes are compulsory, unrequited payments to the
government. We examine more closely the four elements of this definition. We find
borderline cases between tax and non-tax revenue (sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2), which have
no impact on the total revenue. In some cases we adjust taxes and expenditures
simultaneously, without effects on the deficit (sections 2.1.3/a, 2.1.4/a and 2.1.4/c). 
Finally we identify cases, when the adjustment of the taxes has effects on deficit (sections
2.1.3/b and 2.1.4/b). 
2.1.1 Compulsory
The category of social security contributions may include voluntary social security
contributions as well (included in D.6113). There can be borderline cases, since part 
of voluntary payments may be classified as quasi-compulsory ones (e.g. in Germany),
otherwise these payments should be reclassified as non-tax revenue from the category 
of taxes (see §8 in the OECD interpretative guide). Voluntary contributions were closer 
to non-tax revenues in Hungary; therefore they were excluded from social security
contributions.
2.1.2 Unrequited
Taxes constitute unrequited payments because the government provides no direct
benefits in return. One can identify at least two major issues as borderline cases.
a. Although ESA and OECD methodologies classify social security contributions as part of
the tax burden, one could make an argument that these contributions are not taxes
since the government provides a benefit in return. However, even if this was true, tax-
payers consider contributions as burden in the short term. Tax-payers could treat
contribution as (forced) savings if they were perfectly rational AND there were no
liquidity constraints at all. This is why we propose to consider all such mandatory
payments as part of the tax burden, extending this treatment also to contributions to a
fully funded pension pillar (see 2.1.4).
b. Another potentially problematic issue is the distinction between taxes and fees or user
charges. The first condition for classifying a levy as non-tax revenue is a direct link,
which should exist between the payment and the service received in return. The second
question is whether the service is proportional to the payments or considerably exceeds
its costs. In the first case the levy is non-tax revenue, in the second case it is a tax. Fees2
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and user charges may be related to regulatory or allocative functions of the
government.
One of the regulatory functions of the government is to issue licenses, permissions
and certifications for which a fee is demanded. According to ESA and OECD methodologies
if the issue of such licenses involves little or no work on the part of the government, it is
likely that they are simply a device to raise taxes. The actual boundary between taxes and
purchase of services is based on the practices followed in the majority of countries, namely
only licenses to own or use vehicles, boats or aircraft and for licenses to hunt, shoot or fish
are treated as current taxes.   
There are also allocative functions of the government for which fees and user charges
can be demanded. Most of these payments are recorded as non-tax revenue (purchase of
services) according to ESA and OECD methodologies.9 The shortcoming of these
approaches is that they neglect those taxes, which have a clear and direct link to services
provided by the government. As Newbery and Révész (1996, 2000) recognize, part of the
excises on fuel can be classified as a fee for using the public road network. In the Hungarian
case quoted therein, it was clear that a specific part of excises was transferred to the Road
Fund which was in charge of operating roads. Even if such earmarked funds do not exist,
one could introduce a notional fund for analytical purposes. From the users’ perspective,
tolls and excises on fuel are costs of using roads, particularly since excise paid on fuel is
proportional to the use of roads. However, this does not necessarily mean, that these
combined costs are proportional to the service the users receive, as the quality of roads may
vary. The part of these payments, which is proportional to costs of amortization and
maintenance of the road, can be seen as non-tax revenue, while the remaining part of
excises is taxes.10 In order to calculate this proportional part, one can determine the costs.
If a government cuts the maintenance costs the service (quality of roads) decreases, and the
value of the service obtained by the user of the road declines. This implies that a smaller part
of excises can be reclassified as non-tax revenue (user-charge). This means that taking some
measures on the expenditure side may have effects on the tax burden and non-tax revenue.
2.1.3 Payments
Taxes are defined as payments, but tax allowances, exemptions and deductions
negatively affect the amount of taxes. The recording of these tax provisions poses two
problems. 
a. Some tax allowances and credits bear close resemblance to social transfers. Indeed,
frequently they serve as a substitute for explicit transfers. According to the OECD
methodology (OECD interpretative guide, §21) negative taxes can be taken into account
in two different ways depending on their design. If the negative tax (tax credit) does not
depend on current tax liabilities of tax-payers it is the same as a transfer. This so-called
non-wastable tax credit means that any excesses of the tax credit over the current tax
liability are paid to the tax-payers. This tax expenditure should be recorded in a gross
way, increasing both revenue and expenditure. If the size of negative tax is limited by
current tax liabilities of tax-payers, it is not the same as a transfer. Indeed, these
wastable tax credits differ from some mean-tested transfers. In this case tax expenditure
can be treated as a vehicle of redistribution but the average ratio of taxes should not be
corrected. In the case of non-wastable tax credits, the OECD methodology separates the
9 In the case of radio and television licence fees paid to public providers of the service, the OECD method
records non-tax revenues, while the ESA records taxes. We accept the OECD approach here, and this
requires small adjustments of ESA figures in the case of Slovakia.
10 Since excise duties are included in the price which is the base of the VAT, revenue from excise taxes should
be considered on a gross basis, i.e. together with the VAT paid on them.12
2
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‘transfer component‘, which is paid to tax-payers as the excess of the tax credit over the
current tax liability from the ‘tax expenditure component‘, which is that portion of the
credit that is used as a deduction up to the tax-payer’s current liability. The Eurostat
National Accounts Working Party (NAWP) made similar recommendations (Eurostat,
2000). According to this approach in the case of those tax credits which are considered
as integrated parts of the tax system, the amounts paid to taxpayers in excess of their
tax liabilities should be treated as expenditure and the rest should be treated as
reductions in tax revenue. In our view the distinction between these components is not
necessary, since the whole amount of these (non-wastable) negative taxes should be
classified as expenditure. If there are no links between the tax liability and the negative
taxes, they should be completely separated by increasing taxes and expenditures
simultaneously. This was a minority view in the Task Force on Harmonization of Public
Accounting (SNA update), but majority view in the International Public Sector
Accounting Standards (IPSAS) Board (TFHPSA, 2005).
b. The second problem is related to the wastable tax allowances of profit taxes.11 The
problem of the tax treatment of carry over losses is potentially important, but this is not
addressed by the ESA and OECD methodologies. If accrual time of recording of profit
tax had been corrected for this lagged effect of corporate losses, distortions could not
have arisen. On the one hand, these tax allowances are always wastable in the sense
that they are lost once the tax base is reduced to zero as they never result in payments
to the taxpayer. On the other hand, these losses can be deducted from the next years’
tax bases, by carrying forward this negative tax base. As a consequence of the
unrecorded negative tax base, tax revenue can change over time even if actual current
profits of companies do not change. If this negative tax base had been recorded,
developments in both profit tax and profits would have been linked more closely.12 The
practical problem is that loss carry-overs can expire, and some tax-payers can also go
bankrupt without deducting the accumulated losses from previous years. Even though
firm-level information about the portion of negative taxes deducted is not available, an
average discount factor of reported losses may be calculated as an approximation. It
requires aggregate data on the accumulated carry-overs and the yearly deductions. First,
we calculated the sum of deductions in the examined period and accumulated loss
carry-overs at the end of the period and then a ratio between this sum and the sum of
losses reported in the examined period is determined. The reported yearly losses are
discounted with this ratio and compared to the actual yearly deductions related to loss
carry-overs. The difference between these two yearly figures is classified as correction of
the tax base.   
2.1.4 The government as recipient
The category of taxes is restricted only to revenues paid to the government sector
according to both ESA and OECD methodologies. In our view this distorts the measure of
tax burden, since there often are similar compulsory, unrequited payments to the private
sector, which should be considered as burden by those who are obliged to pay them.
11 Tax allowances are different from tax credits, since they are amounts used to determine the tax base, i.e.
the income or profit that is to be taxed.
12 The following example shows the importance of composition effects. If we have two tax-payers, both have
profits of 50 bn, the recorded tax base would be the same as if the first tax-payer had a profit of 100 bn
and the second one a loss of 100 bn. The tax revenue would be the same in the first year but different in
the following years.
13 Another Australian example is the case of the Superannuation Guarantee Charge (SGC, levied at 9% on a
payroll tax base and paid by employers), which is not included as a tax and therefore not reflected in the
OECD revenue statistics. Since it is compulsory, Neil Warren calculates the SGC at 11.4% of all taxation
revenue in 2001. The inclusion of this would have increased Australia’s level of taxation in 2001 by 3.8%
of GDP from 30.1% to 33.9% of GDP (Burn, 2004).2
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a. One example is the case of certain benefits, such as sick-pay, which employers are
obliged to provide by means of laws or government regulations.13 In the case of sick-
pay the contribution of the employers is dependent on the benefits paid to the
employees in the case of sick-leave; in other words the amount of payments is
contingent upon the period of sick-leave. In our view these benefits and contributions
should be imputed as transfers and taxes, i.e. included in the tax burden on enterprises.
b. Another example is the case of fully funded privately managed pension pillars, which is
relevant for the countries being examined. Of course, there are a number of differences
between these private pillars and the social security funds, but from the taxpayers’
perspective all contributions are considered as burden. It could also be noted that
contributions to a funded pillar may be very similar in nature to contributions to a
notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme, which is classified inside general
government.
c. The national accounts of EU members classify part of VAT and customs duties as indirect
taxes (EU own resources) paid by national residents to the institutions of the EU.
Similarly to the methodology of the ECB, we adjust the tax revenue with the full amount
of these taxes collected. The collection costs are imputed as a sale of services by the
government to the rest of the world. 
2.2 Private adjusted taxes – Government adjusted taxes
In this section we divide the total adjusted tax revenue (AT) into private adjusted taxes
(PAT) and government adjusted taxes (GAT), which is the amount of the tax component of
government expenditure. This component is a potential source of distortions.
– The tax treatment of social benefits varies between countries; in some, pensions and
transfers are subject to taxes and contributions, and this leads to an increase in revenue
and expenditure at the same time. Direct taxes and contributions can be usually
compared to primary income as a tax base.14 But if taxes levied on social benefits are
included in the numerator, their consistent denominator should be augmented with the
secondary income, which mainly consists of government transfers redistributing
income.
–  Some kind of social benefits apparently have no tax content, but at the same time there
are contributions paid by the state to social security funds on behalf of groups of
persons defined by law (e.g. handicapped persons, children, women on maternity
leaves, unemployed, young entrants, officers with early retirement, etc). These amounts
should be also subtracted from the overall tax burden as they do not represent burden
of the private sector.
–  More generally, the size of the taxable government expenditure varies over countries
and time. For example the 50 percent increase in public wages in Hungary increased the
overall amount of taxes paid in 2002-2003, as it expanded the economy-wide wage bill,
which is a significant tax base. At the same time sizeable tax cuts were implemented in
the private sector. Since the effects of these two measures were offset by each other,
the overall tax burden has hardly changed, and the sizeable deterioration in the budget
balance appeared purely as an expenditure increase. Such composition effects can be
controlled for only if one calculates tax burdens in the private and government sectors
separately. 
14 This is equal to the earnings of production factors; wages and profits.14
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–  Apart from differences in the size of taxable government spending, their effective tax
rates can be also very different from those in the private sector. Salaries paid to
government employees, which are subject to labour taxation, but not VAT, account for
a significant portion of government consumption, resulting in a relatively low VAT
burden on government spending. Contrary to that, VAT can not be refunded on the
government intermediate consumption and investment, and effective tax burden can be
higher due to the more effective tax enforcement in the government sector (i.e. tax
evasion is less relevant).  
–  Finally, apart from the direct tax content of government spending, there are other
expenditures (e.g. social benefits, public wages) which affect the disposable income of
the households. Depending on the propensity to consume, these expenditures affect
the households’ consumption and thus indirect taxes. This effect can be regarded as the
second round effect of the fiscal policy. As an option, one can define alternative
measures of taxes, when the ”broad” government tax burden includes the tax
component from these second round effects, and the ”narrow” private tax burden
excludes them (Mars ˇanová and Ódor, 2008).
In order to eliminate taxes paid by the government from the total taxes, two
obstacles should be overcome. The first problem is the lack of data. Usually only the
employers’ contributions can be identified, and the proportion of the unidentified tax
component may vary from country to country. As a solution we looked for alternative data
sources on indirect taxes (from the treasury or Ministry of Finance) and made estimations
for the others (see: in the data chapter).
Another problem is related to the GDP as denominator. If taxes from the government
are eliminated from the numerator, the GDP should be consistently corrected by the GDP
components of the government. The GDP can be measured in three different ways, and
their values differ only slightly due to measurement errors. The problem is that the share
of the government is different in these three measures. According to the production
measure, the GDP is the total market value of goods and services produced by deducting
the cost of goods utilized in the process of production. The income measure can be seen
as the gross income of the producers, which is then distributed through payments to
workers (wages), capital (profits), and government (indirect taxes). The expenditure
measure is equal to the use of income, which is the sum of domestic demand and net
exports. 
As a solution we introduced a more disaggregated approach, which makes
distinction between direct and indirect tax and similarly between their respective potential
tax bases, and finally we aggregate the two calculated tax rates and discuss this in the
following section. 
2.3  Direct and indirect tax rates as neutral tax rates
Although the calculation becomes more complicated with the exclusion of the
government, a closer look at the GDP components as approximations of potential tax bases
proves to be insightful. Major part of taxes, namely income taxes, contributions and capital
taxes ( the sum of them is defined as Td ) link to the GDP measured as gross income.15
Indirect taxes ( Ti) can be divided between taxes on consumption and taxes on production.
The former is closer to the expenditure measure, while the latter closer to the production
measure.
15 For example, the capital tax on housing is in fact an income tax on imputed rent (imputed income of owners).2
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Gross income is measured as domestic income, which is consistent with the source
principle of taxation. The gross national income (GNI) is not an appropriate measure of
potential tax base, since the residence principle of taxation determines only a minor part of
taxes. The problem is that gross income includes not only the factor income (wages and
profits) but indirect taxes as well. In order to avoid the comparison of income taxes and
contributions to a potential tax base which includes taxes, indirect taxes should be
subtracted. In other words, value added at market prices should be replaced by value
added at factor cost ( which finally yields the appropriate tax base Bd ). This category is not
explicitly used in SNA, but it can be easily derived from GDP at basic prices (excluding
indirect taxes) by subtracting the category of ‘other taxes, less subsidies on production’. It
represents the amount remaining for distribution as wages and profits out of gross value
added after the payment of all taxes on production and the receipt of all subsidies on
production. 




The expenditure measure of the GDP covers consumption, investment and exports
by subtracting imports. This is equal to domestic demand and net export. Consumption-
based taxation (e.g. VAT) has a destination principle (exports are exempt and imports
taxed); therefore its potential tax base would be domestic demand, in principle.
Production-based taxation has an origin principle; these taxes are levied on the value of
goods and services produced irrespective of their destination (consumption, investment,
exports). The difference of these two potential tax bases is net export. We chose domestic
demand ( Bi ) as an approximation of its potential tax base, since production-based taxes
have an insignificant share within indirect taxes, with the exemption of the Hungarian Local
Business Tax (LBT). The LBT is levied on the value added domestically produced, but it is
source-based, similarly to most direct taxes. For this reason we decided to reclassify LBT as
direct tax.




These tax rates can be regarded as neutral benchmark tax rates ( NTRi and NTRd).16
Comparing any other measure of effective tax rates to these benchmark tax rates one can
determine the size of redistribution between sectors or different groups of tax-payers.
The weighted average of these two neutral tax rates can be regarded as a hypothetical
neutral tax rate ( NTR ), which could levy the same burden on income and expenditure:
By reducing them to a common denominator:  
16 If these rates were applied for all income and use of income, horizontal and vertical equity could hold,
since all sources and levels of individual tax bases could bear the same burden. This hypothetical
restructuring of the tax burden is not completely revenue neutral, if the effects of the implied tax increases
and tax cuts are not identical. It is the case if elasticities of different tax bases differ, but in practice these
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Note that the aggregate adjusted taxes ( AT ) can be measured as twice this weighted
average, if someone determines the denominator as the simple average of the domestic
demand and value added at factor costs:
The denominator is calculated as the simple average of the potential tax bases,
which means that these potential tax bases are treated as equally important. One could
replace these equal weights with alternative ones, which would allow variation across
countries, but at the same time it would be difficult to avoid variation in time. 
2.4 Benchmark tax rates – private vs. government
Now we are turning back to our original challenge; the exclusion of the government
components from the potential private tax base.  First, indirect taxes can be compared to
government demand, which is the sum of government actual consumption, social transfers
in kind and government investment. Second, the direct taxes and contributions can be
compared to the government value added at factor costs. We focus on the phase of the
generation of income: in other words public wages are not distributed to the households
at this level. The generation of income can be seen as the ultimate economic source of
taxation. Therefore, it is also applied as a potential tax base for the taxes paid on transfers
in cash, which is a tax on the secondary incomes distributed by the government. Since this
creates inconsistency, we calculate two measures for the government direct tax rates. The
first one includes direct taxes and contributions paid on social benefits, and the second one
excludes them. 
Comparing the actual tax burden of individual tax-payers to these private benchmark
tax rates one can determine the size of implicit redistribution between them, which is
caused by preferential tax treatment or ”overtaxing”. Only this measure can provide a
comparable treatment of redistribution on the expenditure side (where individual transfers
are recorded on a gross basis) and the revenue side (where individual differences from the
benchmark tax rates are hidden). Since the comparable measure of redistribution would
require not only private benchmark tax rates but also a measure of the tax burden on
individual basis, this is clearly beyond the scope of our study. On the other hand these
private benchmark tax rates can be used as an input for a detailed comparison, such as the
calculation of the gross social spending (OECD 2006).
Another option for separating the private sector from the government is taking into
account the ‘second round effects’ of fiscal policy on household demand. Changes in
public wages and transfers affect the household’s disposable income (first round effect),
and then the domestic demand depending on their marginal propensity to consume. If we
attribute this second round effect on demand entirely to the fiscal policy, we can have an
alternative, broader definition of the government sector. This definition reclassifies that part
of household demand as a demand of the government, which can be attributed to the
effect of public wages and transfers in cash. Consistently we have a narrower definition of
potential tax bases of the private sector. These alternative definitions provide us alternative
explanations of the developments in the tax burden, but these ratios are less intuitive. They
can be also interpreted as a broad definition in which public employees, pensioners,
unemployed and other recipients of social benefits would be part of the government
sector. 
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2.5 Cyclical adjustment
The trends of private domestic demand and private value added at factor costs can
be measured relatively easily. The cyclical effects can be removed with Hodrick-Prescott
filters from the volume of these indicators, and then the results should be multiplied with
the actual deflators. 
Cyclical effects are more difficult to be removed from the tax revenue, because the
composition of the aggregate output gap matters if there are ”tax-rich” elements like
wages and consumption and ”tax-poor” elements such as profits and investment.
Disaggregated measures of the cyclical adjustment calculate not only the output gap, but
also gaps of private wages, profits, consumption and unemployment (Bouthevillain et al.,
2001; P. Kiss and Vadas, 2006). These approaches define cyclical fluctuations by restricting
them to the developments in the private sector, i.e. government wages, consumption and
investment are excluded; therefore they are fully consistent with our calculations.
The multivariate HP filter method suggested by P. Kiss and Vadas provides a solution
to the problem that both aggregation constraint (gaps of wages and profits should be
equal to the output gap) and the constraint set by the capital and labour income share be
satisfied. In order to derive the cyclical component of the consumption, another
behavioural equation is applied, namely a consumption function. Although this method is
more accurate, as an approximation we use here the univariate HP filter method suggested
by Bouthevillain et al. We use this method to calculate cyclical adjusted values for direct
and indirect taxes paid by the private sector and for their two potential tax bases. 
–  Cyclical components of private value added at factor costs and private domestic
demand and the relevant tax bases (wage, profit, and consumption) are determined by
measuring their deviation from their medium-term trends in volumes. The HP filter is
applied to annual data using a smoothing parameter with a value of 30. The projections
for all macroeconomic variables are extended by 7 years to solve the end point problem.
Since the trends of the denominators (private value added at factor costs and private
domestic demand) are defined in volumes, their values had to be determined in current
prices.
–  Cyclical components of private taxes are calculated by multiplying the current value of
taxes by the estimated gaps in their respective tax bases and constant elasticities
between taxes and tax bases, as an approximation of the lag structures.18
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In this section we describe the data we used in our calculations. Three groups of data
can be identified. First of all, the calculation of the tax bases is based on macroeconomic
data from the National Accounts. As a starting point, the headline tax categories are also
consistent with the National Accounts. Finally, these headline taxes are adjusted on the
basis of different data sources, estimations and expert judgments. We provide a detailed
overview on this third group. 
3.1 Tax bases
In our method different tax bases are defined on the basis of specific macroeconomic
aggregates of the National Accounts such as gross value added at basic prices or domestic
demand. By determining these aggregates with their corresponding ESA codes, the
required data were obtained from the Eurostat database. 
3.2 Headline tax categories
The category of headline taxes covers direct taxes both from households and the
corporate sector, indirect taxes and contributions paid by employers and employees.
Similarly to the tax bases, these data were determined on the basis of their ESA codes. One
exemption is that we use indirect tax data consistent with the methodology of the ECB. It
means that the Eurostat data on indirect taxes are adjusted with those parts of VAT and
customs duties, which are paid by national residents to the institutions of the EU as ”own
resources”. The other exemption is that we reclassify the Hungarian Local Business Tax (LBT)
from indirect tax to direct tax, as we noted in section 2.3. Although the LBT is levied on the
value added domestically produced, it is source-based, similarly to most direct taxes.
Originally this tax was levied on sales, but one third of material costs could be deducted in
1998, two thirds could be deducted in 1999 and from 2000, the base of the LBT is close
to the value added. For analytical reasons we split the LBT into tax on labour and profits in
proportion to their shares in the value added of the private sector. 
3.3 Adjustments
In line with the presentation made in the method chapter, we proposed a wide range
of different adjustments to the headline tax categories. These adjustments require also a
wide range of information. Some data are available from the National accounts; some
other data can be obtained from other official sources, such as cash data recorded by the
Treasury. The coverage of the available data differs country by country; therefore the
missing data are replaced by estimates. In the rest of this chapter we present the sources
of information, which are taken into account in our calculations.3
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3.3.1 Data from the National accounts
National accounts contain data on the employer’s contributions in the government
sector, the social security contributions paid to the fully funded private pension pillar, the
imputed contributions, and the voluntary contributions.
The consumption of the fixed capital on roads was available for Hungary, between
2000 and 2005, both for the roads of the central and local governments, in constant and
current prices.
3.3.2 Data from other official sources
Some other information is not available from the National Accounts, but a part of
them can be collected from alternative sources. The potential sources of this information
are the data obtained from the Treasury, national statistical authorities, the tax authorities,
the Ministries, the State Audit Office or budget documents. They are not entirely consistent
with the data from the National Accounts, but these differences can be controlled by the
experts. For example the Treasury provides usually cash data, while the National Accounts
prefer the principle of accrual recording. In several cases, however, cash and accrual data
are quite similar, since accrual recording can be approximated by a simple time adjustment
of the cash data.
Data from the Treasury are available in Hungary in the case of the VAT paid by local
governments, contributions paid on some social transfers, excise duties on fuel and
maintenance of roads paid by the central government. Data on the tax expenditure can be
obtained from the tax authorities. The Hungarian tax authority provided also data on the
current losses reported under the CIT and the current tax base reduction from carry forward
losses in 1995-2006 and carry forward losses from previous years in 1998-2006. The
Hungarian State Audit Office provided data on the user charges of roads between 2003
and 2006.
In Poland, budget data are available in the case of the tax expenditures, social
security contributions paid to the mandatory funded pension pillar, expenditure on road
maintenance at the central and local government level and effective personal income tax
rates paid by employees and pensioners. The source of this budget data is the Finance
Ministry and its annual reports on budget execution and on tax settlements. 
In Slovakia data are available by request from the Ministry of Finance regarding tax
expenditures, loss carry-overs, social security contributions paid to the mandatory funded
pension pillar, and contributions paid to social security funds by the state on behalf of
defined groups of persons.  National Statistical Office provides data on concessionary fees
by request. Data on operational costs of roads are mostly available from the Ministry of
Transportation and from annual reports of local governments.
3.3.3 Estimation of the missing data
A limitation of the comparison is that not all data are available for every country or
at least some years are not covered by official data. In order to overcome this obstacle, the
missing data were replaced with estimations prepared by country experts. In the rest of this
chapter we provide an overview on these estimations.20
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Table 1. Data sources – summary table
a. We have no data on the VAT, the PIT, employee’s contributions and imputed
contributions paid within the government sector. In order to estimate this tax content
of the government spending, tax rates calculated on nationwide data are extended to
the government sector. The nationwide tax rates are determined on the basis of tax
returns instead of National Accounts. The reason is that the nationwide statistical tax
bases include the effect of tax evasion, and this effect is unlikely to be present in the
government sector. The VAT paid by the government is obtained on the basis of
statutory VAT rates weighted by the shares of tax bases. The PIT paid by government
employees is calculated from the actual tax revenue divided by the tax bases reported
in annual reports on tax settlements. 
In the case of Poland a similar approach is applied in the estimation of the PIT paid by
pensioners. In Poland the contributions paid by government employees is determined
by splitting the total amount of contributions between the government and private
sectors on the basis of their shares in the total wage bill. These shares are corrected with
that part of government wages, which are not subject to contributions. The health care
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contributions are treated separately (they are collected together with the PIT) and their
estimation is based on statutory rates and share of the public sector in the wage bill.
In the case of Hungary, contributions are calculated from the wage bill of the
government sector, on the basis of the estimated rate of contributions. This rate is
estimated on the basis of the statutory rates, augmented with the estimated effects of
specific nominal elements, such as the lump-sum health care contribution and the
ceiling on pension contribution.  In the case of Hungary imputed contributions is split
between government and private sector on the basis of a fixed share, which is close to
the average share within the total employment.
In the case of Slovakia, contributions are determined on the basis of the official rate, PIT
payments of government employees are estimated with an implicit effective PIT rate
calculated as a ratio between the total PIT and the total wage. The VAT on government
consumption is estimated by an implicit effective VAT rate, which is determined as ratio
of the total VAT over the total domestic consumption at current prices. The VAT on
government investment is calculated with the official VAT rate on investments, since full
tax compliance is assumed within the general government sector. Excise duties on
government consumption were estimated in a way, when only fuel consumption was
taken into account.
b. In the countries under examination firm-level data are missing about the deductions
from the CIT base because of loss carry-overs and even the aggregated data on the
yearly deductions contain no information on the year from which the losses originate.
In the case of Hungary we obtain aggregated data from the tax authority about the
accumulated carry-overs and the yearly deductions. Since the sum of reported yearly
losses exceeds the sum of yearly deductions in the examined period (even corrected with
the reported stock of accumulated carry-overs at the end of the period) this gap shows
that only part of the reported losses can be deducted later. From this gap we could
calculate an average discount ratio as discussed in section 2.1.3/b.  The reported yearly
losses are discounted with this ratio and compared to the actual yearly deductions
related to loss carry-overs. The yearly tax bases are corrected with the difference
between these two yearly figures. A negative tax base was determined if discounted
losses are higher than the deduction from the tax base in the same year. Then a negative
tax liability calculated on this negative tax base is subtracted from the profit tax revenue.
In the case of Poland data on the yearly deductions are available for 2003-2007 from
the annual tax settlement reports. We obtain statistical data on profits and losses of
corporations, but data about the accumulated carry-overs are missing. We calculate the
average gap between the actual CIT and the hypothetical CIT revenue – which would
have been paid if no losses were deducted – over the period 1995-2006. The average
gap is 24%, which means that 24% of losses were deducted from profits on average.
This ratio is applied for each year to losses incurred in that particular year, yielding an
amount deducted from the tax on profits earned in this year. This twelve-year average
is somewhat higher than the average of the actual deductions (18%) in 2003-2007.  If
data were available about the accumulated carry-overs, a more precise discount rate
would have been calculated, since the average gap of 24% implicitly assumes that the
stock of the accumulated carry-overs is equal to zero at the end of 2006. In the case of
Slovakia, we follow the same approach, since data on losses of corporations and
deductions from the tax base is available from tax returns. For the horizon of 14 years
we have calculated the average ratio between these data, and then we applied this
average gap to reported loss in each year and calculated the hypothetical CIT that we
compared to the actual CIT.  22
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c. Road statistics are also not comprehensive for the three countries. Road maintenance is
defined by the World Bank as the total expenditure „that would be required to keep
roads in working order.  This includes maintenance, patching and running repairs (work
related to roughness of carriageways wearing course, roadsides, etc)”. The definition of
maintenance costs varies from country to country, since it can include not only regular
costs (”maintaining the functionality of existing infrastructure within its original
lifetime”), but non-regular costs (”prolonging the lifetime of the infrastructure without
adding new functionalities”) as well (European Union Road Federation, 2008). Available
data from these sources are fragmented and have a narrower coverage than the official
data we used.  In the case of Hungary these official data exclude the maintenance of
local roads. We assumed that the available data about the central spending and the
missing data about the local spending are proportional to their shares within the
consumption of fixed capital on roads. In the case of Poland and Slovakia the
consumption of the fixed capital on roads is not available; therefore it is estimated by
applying the (legal) rate of depreciation of roads to the stock of public capital in the
transport sector multiplied by the share of investment on roads in the overall public
transport investment.4
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4.1 Description of calculations performed
As noted in Chapter 2, the commonly used tax ratios may distort the true picture of
the burden imposed by the government sector on economic activity. Therefore, in order to
obtain an appropriate and meaningful measure of the tax burden, adjustments need to be
made. The approach we propose entails three main types of adjustments:
1. Adjustments of tax bases, to which the tax burden is compared. As noted, we adjust the
GDP to remove the government component – on the income side, by deducting the
government value added as well as taxes and subsidies; and on the demand side, by
deducting government consumption and investment, as well as net exports, which are
not subject to taxation. 
2. Adjustments of the headline tax burden for borderline cases and time of accrual
distortions. These are adjustments made to tax revenue in order to bring it in line with
the economic definition of taxes – namely compulsory, unrequited payments to the
government, which are accounted for at the time when they accrue. 
3. Adjustments of the headline tax burden, meant to eliminate taxes paid by the
government sector or financed with government expenditure, as these amounts do not
constitute a burden imposed by the government on economic activity and do not affect
private agents’ incentives. 
4.2 Tax base adjustment
The aim of this set of adjustments is to obtain a measure of economic activity, which
is the closest to the potential base on which taxes are paid by private agents. This entails
above all the removal of the government component of the GDP. Since taxes are paid both
on demand (indirect taxes) and income (labour and corporate taxes), we need to consider
the GDP calculated from these two sides.
On the demand side, we firstly remove net exports. All three countries have been net
importers for most of the analyzed period and in all three, the negative share of net exports
in GDP has been declining towards the end of the period, so there are no major differences
between them. The second stage is the removal of the government component of demand
– government consumption and government investment. Here, the share of government
demand in GDP is the highest in Hungary throughout the period. It exhibits some variation
at around 23%-27%, but without any clear tendency. The ratio is also relatively stable in
Poland, at a level of 21%-22%. Meanwhile, in the case of Slovakia, it shows a clear
declining tendency over the period, falling from over 27% in 1996 to below 20% in 2007.
This is reflected in the development of the ratio of private domestic demand to GDP, which
implies that in Slovakia actual bases on which economic activity is being taxed, have been
rising faster than the nominal GDP. As noted in Chapter 2, the concept of removing the
government component from the tax burden may be further extended to taxes paid on
consumption of government employees and social benefit recipients (see 4.4). In such a24
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case, the tax base also needs to be additionally adjusted by deducting government wages
and social benefits to obtain a narrow measure of private domestic demand. The average
of this measure and private income shall be noted as ‘average narrow private demand’ and
serve as the relevant tax base for the narrow measure of the adjusted private tax burden.
Table 2. Adjustments performed to obtain an average adjusted private tax base
Source: Own calculations (sources of data for calculations described in Chapter 3).
On the income side of the GDP, the removal of the government component from the
tax base involves deduction of taxes less subsidies and government value added. The share
of the private sector calculated in this manner in the GDP is clearly the highest in Slovakia,
at around 75%. A modest rise in the ratio may also be observed in Poland, from 72% to
74%, whereas in Hungary, the share of the private sector is the lowest and declines from
73% to 71%.
In order to obtain a single tax base measure, to which the overall tax burden may be
related, we calculate an average of the two measures described above – private domestic
demand and private income. Relative to the GDP, the average private tax base is the highest
and rising in Slovakia, it is also slightly rising in Poland. Meanwhile, in Hungary the share
of the private sector in the economy is clearly the lowest of the three countries and
declining further. 
% of GDP 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Share of net exports
Hungary 0.0 0.5 1.0 -1.4 -2.7 -3.6 -1.2 -2.0 -3.9 -2.8 -1.1 0.6 2.3
Poland 2.2 -1.4 -3.9 -4.8 -5.9 -6.4 -3.7 -3.4 -2.6 -2.0 -0.4 -0.6 -2.7
Slovakia 2.1 -10.9 -9.8 -10.9 -4.5 -2.6 -8.2 -7.3 -1.9 -2.7- 4.6 -3.8 -1.1
Share of government demand 
Hungary 25.3 23.7 24.6 25.1 24.5 24.1 24.9 27.0 26.6 25.9 26.4 27.3 25.0
Poland 22.0 21.9 21.6 21.2 20.9 19.8 21.3 21.3 21.5 20.9 21.5 22.1 22.1
Slovakia 24.0 27.7 27.3 26.3 23.1 23.0 23.8 23.8 23.2 21.7 20.6 21.4 19.2
Private domestic demand = GDP – net exports – government demand
Hungary 74.7 75.8 74.4 76.4 78.2 79.5 76.3 74.9 77.3 76.9 74.6 72.2 72.8
Poland 75.9 79.6 82.3 83.7 85.0 86.6 82.4 82.1 81.1 81.0 78.9 78.4 80.6
Slovakia 73.8 83.2 82.5 84.6 81.4 79.6 84.4 83.5 78.7 81.0 84.0 82.4 81.9
Narrow private domestic demand = GDP – net exports – govt demand – public wages and transfers 
Hungary 51.6 56.2 55.9 57.5 59.4 61.9 58.1 55.3 56.2 55.8 52.8 50.3 51.4
Poland 55.1 58.6 61.4 63.7 64.1 66.4 61.1 60.8 59.9 60.9 59.3 59.5 62.5
Slovakia 54.5 63.8 63.6 65.9 62.0 61.0 65.9 64.7 61.7 64.0 67.3 66.2 66.3
Taxes less subsidies on products
Hungary 11.9 11.9 11.3 12.0 12.3 14.5 13.6 13.2 14.1 14.7 14.4 13.6 13.9
Poland 13.3 13.5 13.1 12.4 13.1 12.2 12.1 12.8 12.8 11.9 12.7 13.3 13.6
Slovakia 9.8 10.0 8.8 10.1 9.7 10.0 9.3 10.1 10.5 10.6 11.4 10.2 10.6
Government value added
Hungary 16.7 15.5 15.3 15.2 15.2 14.5 14.8 15.6 16.5 15.7 15.6 15.3 15.3
Poland 14.5 14.4 14.2 13.6 13.6 13.5 14.2 14.2 14.0 13.3 13.3 12.9 12.4
Slovakia 13.6 13.6 13.3 13.4 13.5 12.7 12.8 12.9 12.8 11.6 10.3 10.2 9.6
Private income = GDP – taxes less subsidies – government value added
Hungary 71.5 72.6 73.4 72.7 72.5 71.1 71.6 71.2 69.4 69.6 69.9 71.1 70.8
Poland 72.2 72.1 72.7 74.0 73.4 74.4 73.7 72.9 73.1 74.9 74.0 73.8 74.0
Slovakia 76.7 76.4 77.9 76.5 76.8 77.2 78.0 77.0 76.7 77.8 78.3 79.5 79.8
Average private tax base = average of private domestic demand and private income
Hungary 73.1 74.2 73.9 74.5 75.4 75.3 74.0 73.1 73.3 73.3 72.3 71.6 71.8
Poland 74.1 75.8 77.5 78.8 79.2 80.5 78.0 77.5 77.1 78.0 76.5 76.1 77.3
Slovakia 75.3 79.8 80.2 80.6 79.1 78.4 81.2 80.3 77.7 79.4 81.1 81.0 80.8
Average narrow private tax base = average of narrow priv. dom. demand and priv. income
Hungary 61.6 64.4 64.7 65.1 65.9 66.5 64.9 63.3 62.8 62.7 61.4 60.7 61.1
Poland 63.7 65.4 67.1 68.8 68.7 70.4 67.4 66.8 66.5 67.9 66.6 66.6 68.2
Slovakia 65.6 70.1 70.8 71.2 69.4 69.1 71.9 70.9 69.2 70.9 72.8 72.9 73.04
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4.3 Tax burden adjustment – borderline cases
In the countries concerned, the most significant of these adjustments is the one for
mandatory contributions to the funded pension pillar. In ESA95 national accounts these do
not constitute government revenue, so they are not treated as taxes. However, since they
are mandatory levies on salaries, most households are likely to perceive them in the same
way as social contributions; therefore as part of the adjustment we add relevant amounts
to taxes. In all three countries, these amounts have been increasing since the introduction
of pension reforms (1998 in Hungary, 1999 in Poland and 2005 in Slovakia) and currently
exceed 1% of the average private tax base in all three cases. The second item of the
adjustment is non-wastable tax credits, which are re-classified as government expenditure
on transfers. These are non-existent in Hungary and negligible in Poland, but in Slovakia
they were introduced on a moderate scale in 2005 and have reached a level of around 
0.5% of the average private tax base. The third correction concerns imputed social
contributions on employers, most notably sickness benefits paid by employers. These sums
amount to an equivalent of between 0.2% and 0.4% of the average private tax base. The
fourth correction concerns voluntary social contributions, which are not present in Poland
or Slovakia and negligible in Hungary. However, this adjustment was included in the
methodology, as it is likely to be more significant for other countries. Social contributions
are also adjusted for amounts paid by the government on behalf of certain groups of
people who are currently not working, notably women on maternity leaves. Similarly to the
GFS method applied by the ESCB we adjust indirect taxes with those parts of the VAT and
customs duties, which are paid by national residents to the institutions of the EU as ”own
resources”. Corporate tax revenues are adjusted in such a way that losses are recorded as
negative taxes in the year they accrue, rather than in the following years (as carryover
deductions). In the case of excise taxes, they are adjusted by reclassifying part of the excises
on fuel. Finally, in the case of Slovakia, private taxes are further adjusted with concessionary
fees paid to national television and national radio, because while according to ESA 95
principles they represent taxes, by economic interpretation they are more fees paid for
services. 
Table 3.  Tax burden adjustment (1) Borderline cases
Source: Own calculations.
4.4 Tax burden adjustment – government component
The first major component of tax revenue, which is financed by the government are
taxes paid on social benefits and compensation of government employees. An important
issue here are potential differences in tax regulations between countries. Indeed, among
these countries, Poland is the only one, in which pensions are subject to personal income
taxes, as well as  part of social contributions (the part which goes towards financing health
care). As a result, the total amount of taxes paid on government wages and benefits is
relatively high in relation to the average private tax base. However, in Hungary this level is
similar, albeit for different reasons. There, the main reason for the relatively large figure is
the amount of compensation in the government sector, which is by far the highest of the
three countries, relative to GDP, while the tax rate is also quite high. Slovakia exhibits the
lowest level of taxes paid on social benefits and compensation of government employees,
as the wage bill of the government sector is the lowest of the three countries.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Hungary -2.3 1.9 -1.5 -1.5 -1.2 -1.2 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Poland 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1
Slovakia -3.5 -3.6 -2.9 -2.9 -3.1 -2.7 -2.8 -3.2 -3.2 -1.8 -1.1 -0.5 -0.6
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The second component of taxes financed from government spending is indirect taxes
paid by the government on its intermediate consumption and government investment.
Also in this case, Slovakia exhibits the lowest amount of taxes relative to the average private
tax base. This is due to both lower spending, especially towards the end of the analysed
period, as well as lower tax rates. Meanwhile, in Poland the figure rises towards the end of
the period, partly due to an increase in the VAT rate on construction in connection with EU
accession, as well as a substantial increase in government investment. Nonetheless,
Hungary has both the highest spending level, as well as the highest indirect tax rate on
government spending.
Overall, the amount of taxes financed with government expenditure, relative to the
average private tax base, is clearly the lowest – and declining – in Slovakia, while in Hungary
and Poland it is broadly similar and fairly stable over time.
Table 4. Tax burden adjustment (2)
Source: Own calculations.
It is important to note that the structure of government spending matters. A
disaggregated analysis can reveal that the tax burden on labour is higher than the tax burden
on government consumption and investment. The share of intermediate consumption within
operational costs (labour costs included) is larger in Slovakia than in Hungary and Poland,
this partly explains differences in the government component in taxation.17
As noted in Chapter 2, the removal of the government component may also be
extended beyond taxes paid directly on government expenditure, such as wages or
intermediate consumption. A further adjustment may be applied with a view to the
consumption of government employees and recipients of social benefits, which is financed
with government expenditure. Therefore, taxation of this consumption also constitutes,
albeit in an indirect way, taxation of government spending. If one is seeking to determine
the burden of taxation of economic activity, then all taxes paid by the government or on
components of government expenditure, should be removed. In order to do this, we
estimate effective rates of indirect taxes imposed on the consumption of government
employees and apply them to wages and benefits they receive from the government.
The results of this exercise do not change the previous picture considerably – the tax
content of government expenditure remains clearly the lowest in Slovakia, whereas in
Hungary and Poland it is quite similar. The size of the correction for taxes on consumption
of government employees and benefit recipients is similar in Hungary and Poland – the
former has a relatively higher government wage bill of the government sector, to which
higher labour taxes are applied. However, this factor is offset by the fact that contrary to
Poland, social benefits in Hungary are largely non-taxable. 
Hungary -11.2 -10.4 -10.5 -10.4 -9.7 -9.7 -10.2 -11.2 -11.1 -10.8 -11.0 -10.9 -10.5
Poland -10.8 11.0 -10.6 -10.1 -10.2 -9.6 -10.5 -10.7 -10.8 -10.2 -10.8 -11.0 -10.5
Slovakia -8.1 -8.0 -7.9 -7.7 -7.2 -6.7 -6.8 -6.9 -6.3 -5.5 -4.9 -5.0 -4.5
Tax burden adjustment – overall corrections
Hungary -13.5 -12.2 -12.0 -11.8 -10.9 -10.9 -11.2 -12.1 -11.9 -11.2 -11.5 -11.3 -10.8
Poland -10.5 -10.8 -10.6 -10.7 -10.9 -10.0 -11.2 -11.6 -10.4 -10.1 -10.9 -11.0 -10.4
Slovakia -11.6 -11.5 -10.9 -10.6 -10.3 -9.4 -9.6 -10.0 -9.5 -7.3 -6.0 -5.5 -5.1
Tax burden adjustment – government component
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
17 Another difference between the government tax components in these countries can be explained with the
different share of those social benefits in kind, which are provided via market producers included in the
private sector. In 2006 it was 4.4% of GDP in Slovakia, 3.6% of GDP in Hungary and only 2.2% of GDP in
Poland.
% of avg priv 
tax base4
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Table 5. Tax burden adjustment – extended approach
Source: Own calculations.
4.5 Tax burden adjustment – overall conclusions
Based on the three components presented above – adjustments of the tax base to
exclude its government component, adjustments to the tax burden to exclude its
government component and adjustments of the headline tax burden aimed at bringing it
in line with the economic sense of taxation – we may now calculate the overall adjusted
tax burden measure, which in our view is a more accurate reflection of the burden imposed
by the government on private economic activity.
Figure 1  Headline tax-to-GDP ratio Figure 2  Adjusted private tax burden
A comparison of the headline tax-to-GDP ratio with the ratio of the adjusted private
tax burden to the average private tax base leads to a number of interesting conclusions.
Looking at each of the countries individually, in the case of Hungary, the decline in the tax
burden visible in the headline figures is not replicated in the adjusted measure, where the
ratio stays broadly stable, with the exception of the beginning and end years. This can be
partly explained by the launching of the mandatory funded pension pillar. According to
ESA95 data, contributions diverted to this pillar do not constitute revenue of general
government and as such are not considered taxes, whereas in our approach we treat them
as taxes, as this is the perception of individuals who pay them. As a result, the development
of the adjusted tax burden ratio is broadly similar to the headline one. In Slovakia, the tax
burden was more volatile; there were tax increases as well, partly because of the launching
of the mandatory funded pension pillar. However, there was a tendency of a gradually
decreasing tax component in the government sector.  A similar effect may be observed in
Poland in the 1995-2001 period, when the adjusted tax burden declined by as much as 8.8
percentage points, while the headline one only by 4.7 points, as a result of a pronounced
reduction in the share of the government sector in GDP. In Hungary a temporary increase
in the government sector can be also recognized in 2001-2003, while other elements of
this expansion distorted the private GDP itself (Hornok et al., 2008).
Hungary -4.2 -4.2 -4.2 -4.3 -4.2 -4.1 -4.2 -4.5 -4.6 -4.7 -5.1 -4.6 -4.9
Poland -4.9 -5.0 -5.0 -4.5 -5.0 -4.5 -4.8 -5.0 -5.1 -4.9 -5.3 -5.3 -5.0
Slovakia -4.8 -4.0 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.5 -3.3 -3.4 -3.4 -3.5 -3.5 -3.0 -3.0
Tax burden adjustment – overall corrections (extended approach)
Hungary -20.3 -18.3 -17.9 -17.8 -16.6 -16.5 -17.0 -18.5 -18.5 -17.8 -18.6 -17.9 -17.6
Poland -17.1 -17.6 -17.2 -16.8 -17.6 -15.9 -17.7 -18.4 -17.2 -16.4 -17.8 -17.9 -16.8
Slovakia -18.1 -17.1 -15.9 -15.6 -15.3 -14.2 -14.1 -14.8 -14.1 -11.6 -10.1 -9.1 -8.6
Tax burden adjustment – taxes on consumption of gov’t employees and benefit recipients
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Calculations of the adjusted tax burden also point to some conclusions considering
the relative size of the tax burden among the three countries. Notably, the tax burden of
Poland vis-∫-vis the other two countries appears to be somewhat lower when the adjusted
measure is used, compared to the headline one. This is mainly due to the taxation of social
benefits, which distorts the headline measure of the tax burden.
Table 6. Broad vs narrow adjusted tax burden
Source: Own calculations.
4.6 Tax burden adjustment – disaggregated conclusions
As we noted, the adjustments of the government tax components reflect the
structure of government spending. Due to these adjustments, it will also be revealing to
look at the headline and adjusted measures of the tax burden in disaggregated terms,
namely dividing the tax burden into labour, corporate and indirect tax components. The
headline measures in this case are respective categories of taxes in ESA95 terms, divided by
the GDP. Meanwhile, in the case of adjusted measures, for each of the tax categories we
use a different macroeconomic tax base, the one which is most relevant for this particular
tax category. The adjusted tax ratios are therefore calculated in the following way:
– Labour taxes. To obtain adjusted tax revenue from labour taxation, we take ESA95
revenues from direct taxes on households and social contributions and adjust them for
tax expenditure reclassified as government spending, contributions to the mandatory
funded pension pillar, imputed social contributions on employers, as well as taxes and
contributions on social benefits and the wage bill of government employees. As the
relevant macroeconomic base, we use the balance of primary incomes of households
net of wages of government employees.
–  Corporate taxes. To obtain the adjusted tax revenue from taxes on corporations, we take
ESA95 revenues from direct taxes on corporations and adjust them for the impact of
loss carryovers. As the relevant macroeconomic base, we use the gross operating
surplus in financial and non-financial corporations.
–  The weighted average of these two ratios can be regarded as a neutral direct tax rate,
which could replace the various effective rates. The deviation from this neutral direct tax
rate represents the redistribution via taxation between labour and capital.
–  Indirect taxes. To obtain the adjusted revenue from indirect taxes, we take GFS revenues
from indirect taxes and adjust them for taxes paid on government intermediate
consumption and investment.18 As the relevant macroeconomic tax base we use private
domestic demand. This ratio can be regarded as a neutral indirect tax rate, which would
produce approximately the same revenue as the various effective rates.
Headline tax burden relative to GDP
Hungary 41.6 40.6 39.0 39.1 39.2 38.6 38.3 38.0 37.7 37.7 37.5 37.3 39.7
Poland 37.3 37.4 36.6 35.6 35.1 32.8 32.6 33.1 32.6 31.6 32.9 33.9 34.9
Slovakia 40.4 39.6 37.4 36.8 35.5 34.2 33.3 33.3 33.3 31.9 31.6 29.6 29.7
Adjusted private tax burden relative to average private tax base  
Hungary 43.4 42.6 40.8 40.6 41.1 40.3 40.6 39.8 39.5 40.2 40.4 40.8 44.5
Poland 39.8 38.5 36.7 34.4 33.4 30.7 30.5 31.1 31.8 30.5 32.1 33.5 34.7
Slovakia 42.1 38.0 35.8 35.1 34.6 34.2 31.3 31.5 33.3 32.8 33.0 31.0 31.7
Narrow adjusted private tax burden relative to narrow average private tax base  
Hungary 47.4 44.8 42.5 42.2 42.8 41.5 42.2 41.5 41.6 42.3 42.5 43.5 47.4
Poland 41.4 39.6 37.4 34.9 33.4 30.6 30.6 31.1 31.7 30.1 31.6 33.0 34.4
Slovakia 43.5 39.3 37.0 36.1 35.8 35.3 32.1 32.3 34.0 33.3 33.3 31.4 32.1
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
18 The GFS method adjusts the ESA95 indirect taxes with those parts of VAT and customs duties, which are
paid by national residents to the institutions of the EU as ”own resources”.4
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–  As noted in Chapter 2, the weighted average of the neutral indirect tax rate and the
neutral direct tax rate represents a hypothetical neutral tax rate, which could levy the
same burden on income and expenditure. Comparing horizontally and vertically the
neutral tax rate to the various effective rates, one can determine the size of
redistribution between sectors or different groups of tax-payers.
The labour tax burden as measured with our adjusted indicator in the three analysed
countries shows a development significantly diverging from the headline ratio. The latter
indicates that all three countries have experienced a reduction in labour taxation, with
Hungary’s taxes staying at the highest level of the three and Poland and Slovakia broadly
similar, with the exception of 2006-2007, when Poland’s ratio increases and Slovakia’s
declines. Meanwhile, according to the adjusted indicator, both Hungary and Poland’s
labour taxation ratios tend to rise over the whole analysed period, although with some
fluctuation in the case of Hungary. In addition, Slovakia’s adjusted tax burden is also
declining at a slower pace than the headline ratio. In all three countries this is partly
explained by the impact of the introduction of a mandatory funded pension pillar and the
effect of social contributions previously considered government revenue, now being
classified outside the government sector according to headline figures. In addition, in
Hungary and Poland, this effect is exacerbated by the declining share of household incomes
in the GDP over the analysed period. It is also worth noting, that the adjusted tax burden
on labour in Poland turns out to be noticeably lower than that of Slovakia, rather than
similar as indicated by the headline rate. This is explained by the factor mentioned earlier,
namely a larger adjustment for taxes paid on social benefits and wages of government
employees, due to different rules for taxation of pensions.
Table 7. Disaggregated analysis of adjusted tax burden
Source: Own calculations.
In the case of corporate and indirect taxes, the adjustment has less dramatic results
for the comparison of the three countries. For indirect taxes, the differences between the
headline and adjusted ratios are quite minor. It is worth noting that in Poland and Slovakia
Labour taxation
Headline tax burden relative to GDP
Hungary 21.9 21.7 21.5 21.1 20.6 20.3 20.6 20.6 19.8 19.2 19.5 19.6 21.0
Poland 19.7 19.6 19.3 19.3 18.7 17.4 17.9 17.2 17.0 16.0 16.3 16.8 17.3
Slovakia 19.4 20.5 19.7 19.2 18.8 18.0 18.3 18.5 17.9 16.4 15.9 15.0 15.0
Adjusted tax burden relative to primary income of households  
Hungary 23.3 23.3 23.9 24.4 25.3 25.8 26.1 26.0 25.0 23.1 23.8 24.8 27.4
Poland 19.4 19.8 19.7 20.1 19.4 18.1 18.0 17.5 18.0 17.4 18.4 19.9 21.8
Slovakia 25.2 24.5 23.6 22.5 22.0 21.6 21.4 21.3 21.6 22.1 22.0 21.5 21.5
Corporate taxation
Headline tax burden relative to GDP
Hungary 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.8
Poland 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.6 2.4 2.7 3.0 2.9 3.4
Slovakia 6.3 5.0 4.4 4.6 4.2 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9
Adjusted tax burden relative to gross operating surplus
Hungary 7.8 7.9 8.3 8.6 10.4 11.0 12.2 11.5 11.1 11.6 11.3 11.7 13.7
Poland 28.9 29.6 25.5 20.1 16.2 14.2 11.8 12.4 14.7 13.6 13.6 12.8 15.6
Slovakia 18.3 16.1 14.0 15.1 12.7 11.6 11.6 10.9 10.7 8.8 9.4 9.0 9.3
Indirect taxes
Headline tax burden relative to GDP
Hungary 17.8 17.1 15.6 15.8 16.3 16.1 15.3 14.9 15.6 16.3 15.8 15.3 15.8
Poland 14.2 14.4 13.9 13.1 13.6 12.6 12.5 13.2 13.2 12.9 13.6 14.2 14.2
Slovakia 14.5 13.8 13.1 12.9 12.4 12.5 11.4 11.6 12.2 12.5 12.8 11.6 11.8
Adjusted tax burden relative to private domestic consumption
Hungary 19.2 18.5 16.5 15.9 15.5 14.6 14.2 13.8 14.7 15.5 15.2 14.9 15.6
Poland 16.6 15.5 14.4 13.0 13.5 12.3 12.4 13.3 13.4 13.0 13.9 14.6 14.2
Slovakia 16.2 13.5 12.5 12.5 13.0 13.4 11.2 11.6 13.3 13.4 13.5 12.2 12.7
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 200730
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the decline in the indirect tax ratio in the years 1995-1998 is somewhat greater when
measured by the adjusted ratio. This is because during that period the share of government
demand in the GDP declined, meaning that private domestic demand rose faster than GDP.
Since, as noted earlier, the government demand component is taxed less than the private
one, such a development will cause the adjusted indirect tax burden ratio to decline faster.
As far as  corporate taxes are concerned, one may note that in the case of Poland the
decline in the adjusted corporate tax ratio is much stronger than of the headline one – this
is due to the rising share of corporate profits in the GDP in Poland over the analysed period.
4.7 Underlying tax rates
By applying a disaggregated method of cyclical adjustment, based on the standard
ESCB procedure (Bouthevillan et al, 2001), we also calculate an underlying, cyclically-
adjusted measure of the private adjusted tax burden.
The overall results do not change very much, but the cyclical adjustment does shed
light on some developments, which took place in the analysed countries over the 1995-
2007 period. For example, while the headline measure shows the tax burden in Hungary
to have been clearly declining over the period 1997-2006, the adjusted measure shows
that it has been broadly stable, while the underlying measure indicates, that actually a
small increase took place. In the case of Poland, the headline measure shows the tax
burden to have risen by 3.3 p.p. of the base between 2004 and 2007; the adjusted private
tax burden measure – by 4.3 p.p.; and the underlying measure – by 5.2 p.p.
Figure 3  Adjusted private tax burden Figure 4. Cyclically-adjusted private 
tax burden
4.8 Benchmark tax rates
The calculation of the benchmark indirect tax rate and the benchmark direct tax rate
allow a comparison with the various effective rates. The difference between these effective
and benchmark rates can be regarded as a measure of the redistribution between sectors
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Table 8.  Benchmark tax rates
Source: Own calculations.
Hungary
BTRd 24.3 24.1 24.3 24.8 25.9 26.3 26.7 26.2 25.3 25.1 25.4 25.8 28.9
BTRi 19.3 18.6 16.6 16.0 15.6 14.7 14.3 13.9 14.8 15.6 15.3 15.1 15.8
BTR 21.7 21.3 20.4 20.3 20.6 20.2 20.3 19.9 19.8 20.1 20.2 20.4 22.3
Poland
BTRd 23.4 23.3 22.8 21.9 20.3 18.8 18.4 18.0 18.6 17.6 18.3 19.1 20.8
BTRi 16.6 15.5 14.4 13.1 13.5 12.3 12.5 13.3 13.4 13.0 13.9 14.6 14.2
BTR 19.9 19.2 18.4 17.2 16.7 15.3 15.3 15.5 15.9 15.2 16.0 16.8 17.4
Slovakia
BTRd 25.7 25.0 23.6 23.1 21.8 20.9 20.5 20.2 20.1 19.5 19.7 18.9 19.0
BTRi 16.2 13.6 12.5 12.5 13.1 13.4 11.2 11.6 13.3 13.5 13.5 12.2 12.7
BTR 21.0 19.0 17.9 17.5 17.3 17.1 15.7 15.7 16.7 16.4 16.5 15.5 15.9
BTRd – adjusted direct tax rate; BTRi – adjusted indirect tax rate; BTR – neutral tax rate.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 200732
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Conclusions
We have shown, that the tax-to-GDP ratio has a number of drawbacks as a measure
of the tax burden. Firstly, tax revenue calculated in accordance with the ESA95
methodology is not perfectly in line with the economic concept of taxes, i.e. levies imposed
by the government, which are compulsory and unrequited. Secondly, both tax revenue and
the GDP include a government component, which distorts the true picture of tax burden.
In order to verify the significance of the above-mentioned shortcomings of the tax-
to-GDP ratio as a measure of economic impact of tax burden, we applied a methodology
for adjusting both the numerator and denominator of this ratio to data for Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia. We have found that adjustments we performed are in some cases
quite significant and suggest that the tax-to-GDP ratio indeed distorts the picture of tax
burden.
Firstly, we have looked at the impact of the government sector on the GDP, which is
the denominator of the tax-to-GDP ratio. The size of the government component in GDP
varies over time and among countries. Of the countries analysed, Hungary has the largest
income and demand of the government sector, while these components in Poland and
Slovakia were declining. Secondly, we have looked at government revenue from the
viewpoint of the economic concept of taxes as compulsory and unrequited payments
mandated by the government. We have identified a number of borderline cases, in which
the ESA95 classification appears not to be fully in line with this concept. We have
performed adjustments for these borderline cases and shown that they are relevant for the
overall tax burden ratio. For example, in all the three analysed countries the actual tax
burden faced by employees is currently higher than the headline tax-to-GDP ratio would
imply, because of additional contributions to a mandatory funded pension pillar, which in
national accounts is classified outside of general government. Meanwhile, other aspects of
the tax system differ between these countries. Slovakia is the only one of them, in which
non-wastable tax credits in personal income taxes are non-negligible. They have a lowering
effect on the headline tax burden measure, but because of their non-wastable nature they
are actually equivalent to government transfers. Therefore, in order to obtain a true
measure of the tax burden, they should not be deducted from tax revenue, but instead they
should be added to government expenditure.
Thirdly, we have considered the distorting impact of the government sector on the
amount of taxes paid. This concerns indirect taxes paid on government expenditure,
namely intermediate consumption and government investment, as well as labour taxes
paid on the government sector wage bill. These amounts may differ over time and among
countries, but contrary to what the headline tax burden ratio suggests, such differences are
not a reflection of actual differences in the tax burden imposed by the government on
economic activity. We therefore performed relevant adjustments, again finding that the
potential distortions are quite significant. This is particularly relevant in cases of different
tax treatment of government spending components. For example, in Poland, unlike
Hungary and Slovakia, pensions are subject to personal income taxes, resulting in a higher
amount of taxes paid on government spending. The structure of the government spending
does also matter; labour costs are ”tax rich”, while intermediate consumption is relatively
”tax poor”.5
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Overall, we have found that the adjusted measure of the tax burden reveals different
trends from those implied by the headline tax-to-GDP ratio. Hungary’s adjusted tax burden
stays stable over the analysed period, rather than decline, as the headline ratio shows. This
is because the pension reform and government sector accounts for virtually all of the
reduction in the headline ratio, while the private sector did not see a drop in tax burden.
The adjusted tax ratio in Poland is relatively lower vis-∫-vis the other countries, in part due
to the above-mentioned taxation of pensions. Furthermore, the sizeable decline in labour
taxation in Poland and Slovakia, which the headline measure implies to have taken place in
these countries between 1995 and 2007, was actually less pronounced, when one takes
into account the changes in the composition of the GDP over the period concerned. In the
case of Poland, the opposite is true for corporate taxes – revenue from this source declined
more strongly against the relevant tax base, than against the GDP.
While the adjusted tax measure we propose is by no means a perfect representation
of the tax burden which matters for economic activity, in our view it is a closer
approximation than the commonly used tax-to-GDP ratio and provides useful insights on
how governments’ tax policies may impact private agents.34
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